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Abstract
This paper explores neoliberalisation and its counter-currents through a six-case study of austerity
urbanism in Spain and the UK. Applying Urban Regime Theory it highlights the role of urban politics
in driving, variegating and containing neoliberalism since the 2008 crash. Variegated austerity
regimes contribute to strengthening neoliberalism, but with limits. Welfarism survives austerity
in felicitous circumstances. And, where contentious politics thrive, as in Spain, it holds out the
potential for a broader challenge to neoliberalism. In contrast, austerity regimes in the UK cities are
strongly embedded. The legacies of past struggles, and differing local and regional traditions form
an important part of the explanation for patterns of neoliberalisation, hybridization and
contestation.
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Introduction
The relationship between austerity, neoliberalism and the governance of cities has been a
source of intense debate since the 2008 crash. This paper oﬀers a fresh perspective through a
comparative analysis of austerity urbanism in Spain and the UK. Applying urban regime
theory (Stone, 2015), the paper explores how austerity governance shapes the operational
matrices of urban politics from the standpoint of neoliberalism and its counter-currents
(Peck, 2012: 626). We report a study of six cities: Barcelona and Lleida (Catalonia),
Madrid (Community of Madrid), Donostia (Basque Country), Cardiﬀ (Wales) and
Leicester (England).
Our central argument is that that variation in multi-scalar urban austerity regimes tends to
strengthen neoliberalism in both Spain and the UK. In other words, the common ground
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among diverse governing arrangements is their eﬃcacy in cutting public sector budgets, rolling
back public services and exposing citizens to the chill winds of market competition. However,
where contentious politics are entrenched, as in the regionalised political cultures of Spain,
they weaken the foundations of neoliberal austerity, creating a potential base for broader
regime change. Moreover, regional variation in Spain is such that it poses questions about
where the conceptual limits of neoliberalism should be drawn (Le Gales, 2016).
We proceed in four steps. The paper ﬁrst discusses contrasting perspectives on
neoliberalism, and explains our approach to regime analysis. It then discusses the project
methodology. We proceed to develop a thematically structured discussion of the six case
studies. We ﬁnally develop an inductive comparison of the ‘powers and liabilities’ of urban
austerity regimes (Ward, 2010: 480) and consider the implications of our analysis for
understanding neoliberalism and further adapting regime theory. The paper concludes
with eight propositions to inform future studies of austerity urbanism.
Neoliberalism and austerity
The nature of neoliberalism has generated much controversy in urban theory. At the end of
one continuum, it is the dominant hegemonic project of late capitalism (Anderson, 2000). At
the other end, it is a signiﬁer inducing paranoia, whose substance vanishes when we decide to
think and act diﬀerently (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Encapsulating the globalist position,
Anderson (2000: 7) described neoliberalism as ‘the most successful ideology in world
history’. As evidence of its ubiquity, Streeck and Mertens (2013) argued that discretionary
spending on public goods is everywhere declining, even in Nordic social democracies (also
Crouch, 2011: 21), while a steadily increasing proportion of government resources are tied to
‘ﬁxed’ costs. Gramscian studies, similarly, conceive it as a hegemonic project with globalising
reach, though it is spatially diﬀerentiated and enmeshed with structural contradictions
(Davies, 2012).
Theorists of neoliberalism as a phase of capitalist development argue that it drives global
convergence through inter-alia the growing power of corporations and the expansion of
market logics through the attempt to annihilate anachronistic cultural political economies,
notably clientelism and welfarism (Streeck, 2011), and the ampliﬁcation of contradictions
across ever-more interdependent and intensively competitive territories. Judgments about its
success vary, and urban scholarship is highly sensitive to geo-political variety, captured in
the notion of ‘variegated neoliberalisation’ developed by Peck et al. (2013). However, in
these literatures the singular ‘neoliberalism’ captures the dominant meta-logic,
governmentality, thought collective, hegemonic project and crisis-driver of the 21st
century (Dean, 2014).
There have been multiple challenges to this framing. For example, literatures inﬂuenced
by post-structuralism reject totalizing accounts. Bevir and Rhodes (2010: 82) captured the
zeitgeist, stating that the goal of de-centred research is to ‘challenge the craving for
generality’. They called ‘for the study of local practices, in ways that recognise the
multiple logics at play in diﬀerent conjunctures, and the spaces such ambiguities and
‘‘messiness’’ open up for diﬀerent forms of situated agency’. Blanco et al. (2014: 3129)
concurred that exploring the messiness of urban politics would advance descriptive,
analytical and diagnostic precision. It might also advance the normative-performative
cause of disclosing sanctuaries, points of rupture, new solidarities and harbingers of a
revitalised ‘political’ (Arampatzi, 2016; Dikec¸ and Swyngedouw, 2017).
Sceptics of ‘neoliberalism’ cite three diﬀerentiating trends. First, it does not exist in pure
form, nor could it (Hayter and Barnes, 2012). Nowhere have neoliberalising
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regimes translated objectives unambiguously into outcomes. Libertarians argue, for
example, that by supporting welfare spending, imposing minimum wages, raising taxes,
printing money and bailing out banks, Europe has delivered a pale and inauthentic
version of austerity – an empty political slogan of politicians falsely claiming the mantle
of ﬁscal rectitude.1
Second, and relatedly, governmental agencies and local authorities invariably moderate
neoliberalism, notwithstanding ideological commitments. Spatial and scalar diﬀerentiation is
conspicuous in countries, like Spain, with asymmetrically powerful regional political
economies (Pare´s et al., 2014). Even in the UK, where local political autonomy remains
limited, municipalities and regions respond diﬀerently to austerity by varying spending
priorities, cultivating institutional resilience or accentuating retrenchment (Lowndes and
McCaughie, 2013). Moreover, local states are porous and complex entities, where
adulterated neoliberalism is further diluted (or concentrated) as it percolates through tiers
of government, sectors, agencies, policy arenas, neighbourhoods and political parties. Urban
neoliberalism comprises a ‘fundamentally polyvalent,’ inherently diverse, array of
technologies, practices and outcomes (Ferguson, 2010: 174).
Third, anti-austerity activists contest neoliberalism through the mix of traditional
struggles on the streets and in workplaces, and ‘new urban activisms’ cultivating practical
solidarities from the wreckage of welfarism (Arampatzi, 2016; Walliser, 2013). For Leitner
et al. (2007), the encounter between neoliberalism and its antagonists is a key determinant of
variegation and hybridisation.
Collectively, these literatures problematize totalising claims about neoliberalism by
qualifying, hybridizing, pluralising or altogether de-constructing it. Castree (2006: 2)
observed, for example, that it ‘only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions, and
agendas that immediately call into question whether a thing called ‘‘neoliberalism’’, however
carefully speciﬁed can be held responsible for anything’. Relatedly, Le Gales (2016) argues
that the notion of ‘variegation’ stretches the undoubtedly useful concept of ‘neoliberalism’
too far, failing adequately to distinguish it from ‘liberalism’ and ‘global capitalism’. Studied
closely, the dominant neoliberalism averred by Marxists, Gramscians and economic
institutionalists loses at least some of its force.
Because they are often rooted in competing ontologies linked to critical realism and post-
structuralism, perspectives on totalising and divergent neoliberalism(s) tend to talk past one
another (Varro, 2015). We avoid perpetuating this dualism by conceiving convergence and
divergence in relational terms, instead of as opposites. Convergence in one sphere, or on one
terrain, may strengthen divergence in another, and vice-versa. We study spatio-temporally
complex dynamics of convergence and divergence through a regime-theoretical lens,
focusing on the capabilities and limitations (powers and liabilities) engendered by
austerity governance and its antagonists (Ward, 2010: 480).
Urban regime theory
Stone’s seminal study of regime politics in Atlanta (1989) argued that governing requires
state and non-state actors to build coalitions around congruent interests. The distinctiveness
of regime analysis is that regime building requires eﬀort and cannot be deduced from
positions or imputed interests. It depends on the capacity of actors to form coalitions able
to ‘pre-empt’ the governing agenda and mobilise resources to deliver it. Regime theory thus
downplays the ‘social control’ model, for a social production model. It privileges ‘power to’,
where pragmatic actors have to build alliances if they are to get things done. Regime
formation and maintenance is contingent on this process.
Davies and Blanco 1519
Regime theory generated a vast, disputatious literature. Marxists criticised it for eliding
the contradictory nature of capitalism, the conspicuous dominance of business in American
urban life and the deep multi-scalar interdependencies between state and capital (Davies,
2011; Jessop, 2002). Meanwhile, comparativists debated whether regime theory could
usefully be applied outside the US, given that European municipalities were ﬁnanced
mainly by higher tiers of government and public taxes, and did not require direct
corporate consent to their goals in order to raise revenues (see Blanco, 2015; Davies, 2003
for contrasting perspectives). Nevertheless, for good or ill, this concept stretching turned
regime theory into a ﬂexible tool for understanding diﬀerent kinds of governing coalition in
highly varied local settings. Stone’s own perspective evolved. He reﬂected that his earlier
work had focused too much on the city-business nexus and neglected civil society (Stone,
2009). Nevertheless, he re-asserted the core principles of regime analysis (Stone, 2015: 103):
The guiding tenet in inner-core regime analysis (its ‘‘iron law’’) is that for any governing
arrangement to sustain itself, resources must be commensurate with the agenda being pursued
. . . A companion proposition is that for any substantial and sustained agenda, a stable coalition
is needed to provide the necessary resources.
The advantage of this parsimonious formulation is twofold. It lends itself to ﬂexible,
heuristic interpretations of regime politics and provides a simple benchmark for
comparing otherwise diverse cases: what alliances are forged among which actors,
mobilising what resources in pursuit of which goals? Our study poses this question in
relation to the rollout and contestation of austerity urbanism in Spain and the UK. Our
approach shows how regime politics adds momentum to or, contains, processes of
neoliberalisation through austerity governance.
Methodology
We report research in four Spanish cities, Barcelona, Lleida, Madrid and Donostia and two
UK Cities, Cardiﬀ and Leicester, undertaken between autumn 2013 and summer 2015.
Anglo-Spanish comparisons of austerity urbanism are instructive, because of the
juxtapositions of similarity and diﬀerence they oﬀer. The governments of both countries
adopted austerity after the 2008 crash, with diﬀerent drivers and intensities.2 At the same
time the histories and traditions of Spain and the UK diverge quite dramatically, notably in
territorial politics. Variations in regional and municipal autonomy are signiﬁcantly greater in
Spain than in the UK, and these variations mediate austerity. We selected the cases primarily
to encompass regional diﬀerences between the Basque Country, Catalonia and Madrid in
Spain, and two British ‘country-regions’ of England and Wales. The project incorporated
one case in the Basque, Madrid, England and Wales regions, and two in Catalonia
(Barcelona and Lleida) in order to highlight intra-regional comparisons and contrasts.
Sensitive to the complexity of urban political economies, we did not follow traditional
comparative methodologies, for example in relation to speciﬁed ‘most similar’ or ‘most
diﬀerent’ characteristics. Instead, we opted for a de-centred approach, allowing local
researchers to elicit key points of inquiry in each city, anchored by a problematic
common to Spain and the UK. In the 1990s and 2000s, intellectuals, policy makers and
activists across much of Europe were enthused by the potential of urban coalitions between
state and civil society actors for solving complex collective action problems, joining-up
government and reviving participatory democracy (e.g. Stoker, 2004). It was in this period
that urban regime theory become inﬂuential outside the US, as a medium of studying
coalition politics (e.g. Lawless, 1994). In assessing the governing capacity of austerity
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regimes, we therefore delve into the politics of collaboration, which contributes to
diagnosing the characteristics of austerity governance and its implications for
neoliberalisation. Accordingly, we organise the case study data thematically (Blanco and
Subirats, 2008), discussing: the context of urban austerity, tactics and strategies of key
actors, trends in participatory governance, contentious politics and regime continuity and
change.
The team applied one semi-structured questionnaire across the six cases, translated as
appropriate, from English (the common project language) into Basque, Catalan and
Spanish. Each city-based team conducted a total of 25 interviews across three phases,
through snowball sampling. We undertook content analysis of the qualitative data based
on topic guide themes, and conducted research design and comparison at team meetings.
This was a case-centred study, meaning that each research team conducted a pilot study to
elicit the most important terrains of collaborative governance for further research. This
approach resulted in diverging empirical foci. However, the anchoring in a common
problem enabled us to bring the case studies into meaningful comparative conversations
with one another (Robinson, 2011) and make cautious inductive generalisations to urban
theory. The full case study reports can be read at (https://transgob.net). We include touch-
points to the underlying data for each case in the discussion below. The cross-case
comparison is summarised in Table 1.
Contextualising urban austerity governance
Following the crash of 2008, Spain and the UK introduced a raft of austerity measures:
public spending cuts shrinking the welfare state, marketization, tax cuts for businesses and
intensiﬁed workfare. Municipal ﬁnance in Spain reﬂects the uneven distribution and scaling
of powers in a system of asymmetrically autonomous regions developed to contain
nationalist sentiment, notably in the Basque and Catalan regions (Gallego and Subirats,
2012). Municipalities (themselves endowed with asymmetric powers), agencies, regions and
national government control diﬀerent urban functions. The spatial impact of austerity varied
dramatically for these reasons, as we explain below.3
As part of its austerity drive, Spain enacted new ﬁscal centralisation measures. To meet
EU requirements following the E41 billion bank ‘rescue’ in 2012, the national Budgetary
Stability Law ﬁrst introduced in 2007 was tightened, and in 2013 a new law imposed further
spending controls, making it all but impossible for municipalities to compensate for falling
revenues through deﬁcit ﬁnancing or public debt.4 Municipalities, in any case, had little
control over welfare state policies (health, education and social services) on which
austerity is imposed from above the city.
Urban governance in the UK is a scalar mess, after policy experimentation and
restructuring over decades; a deﬁning characteristic of neoliberalism. Scotland, Wales and
the North of Ireland established ‘regional’ parliaments in the late 1990s, each with diﬀerent
powers. Police, health services, education, welfare, housing, planning and economic
development operate at diﬀerent scales across asymmetric territories controlled by a
variety of departments, agencies and quangos, over which city government has uneven,
sometimes negligible, control. UK municipalities are compelled by law to deliver
austerity and they have no control over welfare reform. They may spend reserves, but
deﬁcit budgeting is prohibited. Municipalities have even less room for manoeuvre than in
Spain.
Although regional diﬀerentiation is nowhere near as dramatic as in Spain the pace, focus
and intensity of austerity varies in the UK. For example, the formula used by the
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UK government to set the budget for Wales created a time lag, meaning that Cardiﬀ was not
hit hard by austerity until three years after Leicester. After the 2014/15 Welsh Assembly
budget, a think-tank commented that it was ‘time to put away the manicure scissors and
reach for the scythe’. In Leicester, the City Council’s revenue grant was projected to have
fallen by 63% between 2011 and 2020.5 The politics of austerity urbanism are enmeshed with
the multi-scalar conﬁgurations of the state in both countries.
Governing strategies and tactics
Barcelona was hit hard by the 2008 crisis, though to a lesser extent than Catalonia or Spain
as a whole and far less dramatically than Madrid. Amid rising discontent, the Partit del
Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) was ousted in 2011 after 32 years in power, by a conservative
nationalist coalition led by Xavier Trias. Barcelona accumulated a large budget deﬁcit
between 2009 and 2011 but by 2013, Mayor Trias had engineered a surplus of E139
million by squeezing municipal spending. In addition to slashing wages and mass
redundancies, he raised taxes, fees and charges and held a ﬁre sale of municipal assets (for
example Port Vell), privatising services, infrastructure and public space. Trias owned the
textbook neoliberal policy of surplus budgeting. He also accelerated the urban boosterism
entrenched in municipal policy since the 1992 Olympics (Blanco, 2008). In 2013, for example,
he launched the Barcelona Nautical Cluster, a partnership between the City, the Port
Authority and 35 companies and public institutions, unashamedly to promote the city as
one of the world’s leading destinations for super-yachts.6
Lleida is a fraction of the size of Barcelona (around 1/10), but an important centre for
services and communications in Catalonia. Lleida’s politics have been dominated by the PSC
for nearly 40 years, notably through two Mayoral regimes built around the personalities of
Antoni Siurana (1979–1987 and 1989–2003) and A`ngel Ros (2004–present). While
committed to redistribution, the tone of local politics was, unlike Barcelona, small-c
conservative, infused with the cultural inﬂuences of Catholicism. The full force of
austerity hit Lleida later than Barcelona, partly due to the resilience of municipal
revenues and agricultural rents, and partly because the initial impact fell on seasonal
migrant labour. With municipal spending stable between 2007 and 2011, the Mayor was
able to mute any sense of crisis. However, spending was cut dramatically between 2011 and
2013, with the city mired in debt. One oﬃcial said Lleida had since been ‘completely
overwhelmed’ by the social impact of austerity.
Like other PSC and PSOE mayors, Ros pursued boosterist policies, marketing Lleida as a
modern, attractive place to live and work. However, tying his reputation to sustained growth
undermined the Mayor’s capacity to connect with emerging anti-austerity currents,
contributing to the erosion of his power base in the neighbourhoods. An activist
commented, ‘I do not think the mayor does inclusive social policies. I think they want to
do things, and do them well, but at the expense of the social organizations, and without a
budget, too. On the other side, they want to do great public works with very high budgets.
This is where we have the conﬂict’.
Madrid was hit exceptionally hard by austerity. When the bubble burst, years of
speculation combined with the ﬁscal squeeze to leave the city holding 17.7% of all
municipal debt in Spain, though fewer than 7% of citizens live there. Both the city and
region of Madrid were longstanding conservative (Partido Popular) and aggressively
boosterist strongholds, creating a powerful enabling regime for austerity urbanism. Many
tens of thousands of people lost their homes to foreclosure, leading Human Rights Watch to
condemn the government for failing to protect its citizens.7 For more than a decade, Madrid
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sought to position itself as a ‘global city’. Despite the crisis and speculative debt, it continued
to do so under Mayor Ana Botella (2011–2015), launching its third successive Olympic bid,
for the 2020 Games (De la Fuente, 2015). At the same time, the Regional Community of
Madrid launched the Madrid ‘EuroVegas’ project, a vast suburban gambling complex for
which it oﬀered the developer sweeteners, including a massive cut in gaming tax.8 However,
both projects failed: the Olympic bid was rejected in part because of the City’s precarious
ﬁnancial position, while Eurovegas collapsed in the face of the ‘Stop Eurovegas’ campaign,
uniting historic adversaries on the left and in the Catholic Church. Juxtaposed with severe
retrenchment, these developments accentuated a widespread sense of failure in the global city
project.
Donostia (San Sebastian) is situated in the Basque Country. Unlike other cities, minority
government is the norm. The left-nationalist BILDU coalition took oﬃce in 2011, with
conservative nationalists assuming power in 2015. The Basque region was not immune to
the crisis, and suﬀered a GDP contraction similar to that of Spain as a whole (Standard and
Poor’s, 2014). However, the ﬁnancial situation in Donostia deteriorated far less dramatically
after 2008 than in our other cities. It avoided major cuts to municipal budgets and services
and maintained social protection supported by longstanding regional policies, such as the
minimum income guarantee and taxes on empty property, which dis-incentivise foreclosure.
The primary explanation for this exceptional case lies in Donostia’s ﬁnancial good
fortune. The Basque Country is the wealthiest region of Spain, and enjoys the greatest
budgetary autonomy. It is exempt from the national ﬁscal equalisation scheme, retaining
control over all tax revenues. In felicitous geo-political, economic and budgetary conditions,
Donostia sustained its redistributive social policy, in juxtaposition with successful city
branding. Since the formal end of ETA’s armed struggle in 2011, the city has enjoyed a
‘peace dividend’, culminating in the award of European Capital of Culture for 2016.
Cardiﬀ, the capital of Wales, is a Labour Party stronghold. In the context of tight
Westminster control over regional ﬁnances, post-devolutionary Wales sought to sustain
‘clear red water’ with English Blairism9 embracing the legacies of social democratic
welfarism. These commitments were reﬂected in collectivist policies denied to English
counterparts, such as free medical prescriptions. Otherwise, Cardiﬀ operates within the
doctrine of ‘austerian realism’, where cuts are implemented in a spirit of realpolitik due to
statutory constraints and for lack of any perceived political alternative (Davies and
Thompson, 2016). Cardiﬀ’s governance strategies are oriented to coping with, managing
and mitigating austerity through rationalisation, eﬃciency savings and up-scaling functions
such as economic development. Cardiﬀ markets itself as ‘a world class European capital city’
with an ‘exceptional quality of life’ at the ‘heart of a competitive city region’. This
competitive city region discourse lent momentum to the rationalisation and
metropolitanisation of local economic development (Pill and Guarneros-Meza, 2017).
Leicester is of similar size to Cardiﬀ, but occupies an inferior position in urban
hierarchies. It too is a Labour stronghold. In 2011, it established the oﬃce of City
Mayor, occupied by the inﬂuential ﬁgure of Sir Peter Soulsby. Leicester ﬁgures
prominently in national deprivation indices, with high structural unemployment coupled
with in-work poverty and low household incomes.10 The city’s approach is consistent with
‘austerian realism’. As one councillor put it, ‘We are not happy making cuts but we cannot
set an illegal deﬁcit budget. If we do Eric Pickles will simply come in and take over the
running of the council’.11 At the same time, Leicester City Council (LCC) sought to mute
any sense of crisis through diligent management of the cuts programme and trying
to mitigate the worst eﬀects. One councillor explained the approach arguing, ‘drama and
conﬂict aren’t in the best interests of the city’.
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In a development that seemed improbable only a few years ago given its ‘collective
inferiority complex’ at that time (Councillor), Leicester has recast itself as an
entrepreneurial city. It is rolling out growth and investment strategies, with the goal of
becoming a ‘conﬁdent and competitive city’. It has developed policies for tourism,
sport, urban living, creative industries and a cultural quarter. These developments are in
part a response to austerity, catalysed by the City Mayor and boosted by the discovery of
King Richard III’s remains and most recently Leicester City’s Premier League triumph
in 2016.
Trends in participatory governance
Public participation has been central to the so-called ‘Barcelona Model’ since the 1980s,
rooted in the city’s social democratic and cooperative traditions. An elaborate participatory
structure is built into the institutions of city governance (Blakeley, 2005; Blanco, 2015). The
research pointed to two distinct circuits. Economic development policy was elite-focused and
mostly insulated from public inﬂuence (despite an escalating campaign against the negative
impact of tourism), exempliﬁed by the nautical cluster and its celebration of extreme wealth.
The ‘social policy’ circuit was more open, including a wide range of voluntary and
community groups incorporated through an extensive participatory infrastructure linked
to the Barcelona Model, including the Municipal Council of Social Welfare and Citizen
Agreement for an Inclusive Barcelona. Although activists argued that participatory
mechanisms have ‘neither social legitimacy nor executive capacity’, they sought to defend
them against rationalisation. However, institutional layering under Trias distanced the
participatory apparatus from political decision-making. At the same time, the rise of
contentious politics (discussed below) meant that the participatory infrastructure was of
diminishing importance for activists too.
The clientelistic relationship between the Mayor and neighbourhood associations was, for
decades, the most important site of dialogue between city and citizens in Lleida underpinning
Mayoral authority through the exchange of electoral support for funding and status. A local
militant observed, ‘In Lleida there is a serious ‘‘bossism’’ (caciquisme). The city hall controls
the neighbourhoods through the neighbourhoods associations’. However, the inﬂuence of
neighbourhood associations was declining due to disengagement among younger people,
eroding both the activist base and political currency.
The moral element of Lleida’s governing tradition came to the fore in collaborative
responses to austerity, rooted in the enduring inﬂuence of Catholicism. In 2013 nine
Catholic social care bodies combined to create a Christian Network of Social
Organizations. These were important partners for local and regional authorities in
managing the dispossessions of austerity. Lleida’s participatory traditions were thus
inﬂected with both clientelistic and moralistic qualities, the former starting to fade and
the latter coming to the fore under austerity.
Whereas the Barcelona model institutionalised political participation, and Lleida
clientelism with moral obligation, Madrid accentuated strong leadership and weak
participation. Participatory structures never acquired great institutional weight. For
example, as one activist put it, working class neighbourhoods had long rejected ‘futile
instruments of participation, due, (to a large extent) to the indiﬀerence, or even
malevolence of the President Councillor’. As part of its post-crisis retrenchment, the City
further curtailed neighbourhood governance mechanisms and concentrated power in the
Mayoralty. Anti-austerity activists did not think the rollback of participatory structures
mattered, however. As one commented, they were ‘empty of relevance’ to start with.
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The 1990s and early 2000s saw an explosion of participatory governance in the UK,
driven from the top-down by New Labour. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) across the
country were charged with coordinating public sector activity and enrolling community and
voluntary groups into extensive participatory bureaucracies (Geddes et al., 2007). Cardiﬀ
and Leicester followed this blueprint, with local variations. After devolution, the Welsh
Assembly established the neo-corporatist ‘three thirds’ model (Bristow et al., 2008). The
Cardiﬀ Partnership operationalized the three-thirds model, institutionalising public,
private and third sector engagement. The infrastructure was maintained throughout
austerity, but the politics changed. For example, the city council was trying to cultivate a
business mentality among third-sector partners through ‘results based accountability’.
A council oﬃcial said: ‘They have to prove their business case and they’ve got some really
good evidence now in terms of the beneﬁts of time banking, but where I think they’re weak is
the lack of the business model . . . I can’t promote their business model because I don’t see
the eﬃciencies coming out of it as getting bigger’.
Respondents in Leicester took a dim view of institutions from the New Labour period.
On assuming oﬃce, Sir Peter Soulsby dismantled the LSP bureaucracy, using his authority
as City Mayor to cultivate a more informal approach centred on his leadership. These
changes were not directly linked to austerity, but they made sense in that context by
equipping the city with a more agile decision-making process. Like Cardiﬀ, our research
showed that collaborative mechanisms in Leicester were moving towards an increasingly
managerial focus on competitiveness and results-based accountability. One voluntary sector
respondent commented of the increasingly competitive funding environment, ‘we try not to
be overtly critical’ because ‘we are paid by the local authority for a number of our services’.
Respondents agreed that participation inﬂuenced the distribution of cuts, but was marginal
to determining austerity policies.
The experience of participatory governance in Donostia diﬀered, with a variety of new
initiatives rolled out after the election of BILDU in 2011. These developments were inﬂected
by complex locality factors. First, no party had enjoyed an electoral majority in Donostia in
the preceding 20 years even though it had only one Mayor during this time, Odo´n Elorza of
the Basque Socialist Party, the Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE). The national conﬂict had
inhibited the development of a participatory culture, but at the same time weak municipal
government created incentives for a more inclusive approach, leading to new participatory
initiatives. Donostia’s successful bid for European Capital of Culture lent further impetus.
After 2011, BILDU developed a participatory model rooted in neighbourhood assemblies,
including participatory budgeting and local referenda. According to one oﬃcial, the goal
was ‘to generate a political culture and from there focus action on participation’. Legacies of
the independence struggle made plurality and inclusivity diﬃcult, but respondents thought
spaces of mutual recognition and understanding were developing.
Contentious politics
The centre of activist gravity in Barcelona shifted from participation to resistance after the
crash. The protests of 15 May 2011 (15-M) transformed the political environment. The
Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) housing campaign to defend citizens from
foreclosure and eviction became perhaps the most inﬂuential movement. In Barcelona,
where PAH was born, it operates ‘in and against’ the state through confrontation,
negotiation and practical support for debtors and foreclosure victims (De Weerdt and
Garcia, 2016). The PAH organises throughout Spain and is an excellent example of a
movement rooted in urban activisms rising to the national stage.
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Alongside the insurgency, Barcelona witnessed an explosion of ‘new urban activisms’
(Walliser, 2013) including cooperatives, food and clothes banks, community gardens and
social enterprises (Blanco et al., 2016). These spaces remain deeply entwined with and
dependent on the political energy of the post-15M movement, and they can have an
impact. For example, activists forced the municipality to give up some parcels of
marketable land for community use.
Though on a smaller scale than Barcelona, 15-M had begun to alter the political
landscape in Lleida. The Lleida branch of the PAH was typical insofar as it combined
pragmatism in responding to evictions with insurgent and practical solidarities. As in
Barcelona and Madrid, the occupation of empty property was popular and forced
concessions from Ros. Protestors were also subject to repression, as police cleared the 15-
M camp by force shortly after the municipal election of 2011. Ros denied complicity and
blamed regional oﬃcials. There was some evidence of consolidation among anti-austerity
activists in Lleida. For example, local organisations involved in the defence of public services
(the so-called marea or tides) joined together in forming an Assembly for the Defence of
Public Services.12 However, these forces were not strong enough for an electoral
breakthrough in May 2015.
As in Barcelona, mobilization in Madrid shifted towards insurgency after 15-M and the
occupation of Plaza del Sol. The principal legacy has been the lessons drawn by activists,
nourishing rebelliousness and experimentalism. Since 15-M, Madrid has been the terrain of
myriad anti-austerity protests and movement building and has witnessed a ‘renaissance’ of
new urban activisms, uniting around the electoral coalition, Ahora Madrid.
Relations between anti-austerity activists and the city government were ambivalent. On
the one hand, Madrid tolerated and sometimes promoted the appropriation of empty
buildings – even trying to recuperate the urban art of insurgents to the tarnished ‘global
city’ brand. On the other hand, it took a confrontational stance towards militancy by La
PAH and the marea. Practical solidarities were tolerated and even encouraged until they
overstepped political boundaries, leading to repression.
The Basque Country has a strong tradition of political organisation linked to the national
struggle. Respondents suggested that the conﬂict deﬂected potential activists from anti-
austerity work, meaning that the impact of 15-M was much weaker in Donostia, even
when relatively benign economic circumstances are taken into account. Donostia was not
immune to the foreclosure crisis and PAH had a presence in the city, as did civil society
organisations carving out solidarity spaces. In September 2012, there was a Basque-wide
general strike against the national austerity government. However, the post-conﬂict spirit of
reconciliation, regional ﬁscal autonomy, and relatively mild impact of the crash were cited as
reasons why anti-austerity politics had been muted.
Until the 1980s, the UK had a strong organized Labour movement. The decimation of
manufacturing industries and the defeat of trade union struggles to defend them seriously
eroded that culture. Defeats inﬂicted in the Thatcher era continue to cast a shadow over the
political landscape, reﬂected in the ‘austerian realism’ of Labour municipalities (Davies and
Thompson, 2016). The unions have not recovered, and movements rooted in ‘new urban
activisms’ have not developed to a great extent. The cultures of protest in Cardiﬀ and
Leicester were weak by historic British and current European standards.
At the same time, there have been energetic attempts to protect public services, for
example a campaign to resist privatisation led by Cardiﬀ Civic Society. However, the
impulse to resist austerity also tended to be channelled downscale into ‘resilience’ and
‘co-production’. Cardiﬀ’s Community First programme sought to cultivate community
management of increasingly threadbare services and facilities. Local activists were
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conﬂicted about this. As the Chair of Cardiﬀ Civic Society put it, there is a ‘moral question
about allowing more and more of the land that was given for public use to be used for
commercial purposes’.13 However, co-production was accepted as a last defence against full
commercialization, occupying a nebulous space between neoliberal self-help and contentious
politics (Gregory, 2015).
As in Cardiﬀ, Leicester’s protests have been mostly small, including recurrent street
demonstrations, public meetings and occupations against service cuts and welfare
reforms.14 However, the city was perceived to lack the rebellious culture of previous
generations, recalled by older respondents. Memories of defeat inﬂicted by the Thatcher
government continued to mute any appetite for a more confrontational approach within
LCC (reﬂected in the remark about Eric Pickles quoted earlier). Some thought that people
not caught in the workfare trap had not been badly hit, and that citizens were far less active
than in previous decades. Said one councillor of the cuts, ‘a lot of them are happening almost
without a squeak.’ There had not been the ‘howls of protest’ that they anticipated.
Moreover, ‘for most people most of the time, this doesn’t aﬀect them very much. For
most people, life goes on’. Like Cardiﬀ, LCC was starting to rollout co-production
initiatives, notably the Transforming Neighbourhood Services programme of asset
transfers and service mergers. This was deemed important for mitigating austerity and
protecting services, and posed similar questions to those being asked in Cardiﬀ about the
boundaries between self-help, participation and resistance.
Regime continuity and change?
In three cities, Barcelona, Madrid and Lleida, the attrition of longstanding municipal orders
highlighted the potential for broader regime change. In Cardiﬀ, Donostia and Leicester, for
diverging reasons, governing arrangements were durable. The prospects for regime change
were greatest in Barcelona and Madrid. In May 2015 founder member of the PAH, Ada
Colau, acceded to the Mayoralty through the Barcelona en Comu coalition. From a base in
inter-linked protests, negotiations and practical solidarities, the anti-austerity movement
won an important foothold in government (11 out of 45 council seats). The Podemos-
backed Ahora Madrid coalition propelled Manuela Carmena to the Mayoralty, taking
31% of the vote (second place) and winning 20 of 57 seats.
At the same time, the right retains considerable power and inﬂuence in both cities through
networks of economic actors, banks, the media and regional authorities. Respondents in
Barcelona highlighted, for example, how national media, which never paid much attention
to local politics, now works on behalf of pro-austerity elites by trying to destabilise the anti-
austerity coalitions (a point made in conservation). In other words, the governance of
Barcelona and Madrid can be depicted as a struggle between municipal anti-austerity
coalitions and allied social movements on the one hand, with regional and national
authorities, media and corporate elites arraigned on the other.
Lleida is the third city in which the traditional governing alliance is failing. The
legitimacy of the Mayoral regime rested on its capacity to provide strong continuous
growth, low unemployment and side-payments to the neighbourhoods. But in the 2015
municipal election, amid growing public disillusionment and a rising chorus of criticism,
the PSC lost half its seats falling to a minority position of 8 out of 27. Lacking a
formal coalition and with diminishing political capital in the neighbourhoods, Ros must
now negotiate support on an issue-by-issue basis. In the absence of a clear alternative to
the old clientelistic regime, political inertia seemed the most likely medium-term
outcome.
1528 Environment and Planning A 49(7)
On the other hand, there was little sign that the dominant governing regimes of Cardiﬀ,
Leicester or Donostia were vulnerable. Both Cardiﬀ and Leicester had stable ‘austerian
realist’ regimes, political cultures in which national government sets the rules, no
mainstream social actor refuses austerity and resistance has little direct impact. The
impact of Brexit on austerity urbanism in the UK remains to be seen, but the
aftermath of the referendum has seen no slow-down in municipal retrenchment.
Donostia was again the ‘outrider’ case, accentuating regime continuity but for very
diﬀerent reasons. Further bucking trends elsewhere in Spain, it voted in a Conservative
coalition in May 2015 led by Mayor Eneko Goia of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV),
with support from the PSE. While implications for participatory governance were unclear
as the study concluded, the new coalition did not immediately signal a change in
Donostia’s broad social and economic strategy. Party political churn appeared less
signiﬁcant than traditions associated with coalition government, welfarism and, more
broadly, Basque political economy.
Austerity, neoliberalisation and governability
The research points to ﬁve ways in which austerity governance has driven variegated
neoliberalisation. First, it suggests that where they are rolled out, austerity measures have
been expedited straightforwardly, without signiﬁcant impediment. With the exception of
Donostia, public welfare has been dramatically scaled back and city-dwellers bear the
costs. The realm of the market is duly extended. In this sense, austerity urbanism is a
powerful driver of ‘rollback’ neoliberalism, ‘the active destruction or discreditation of
Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 37).
Second, all six cities were attempting to deliver growth strategies commensurate with
their (perceived) status in urban hierarchies. These strategies are themselves an important
facet of austerity urbanism insofar as they intensify competitiveness, divert resources from
public goods into speculative endeavours and increase public debt. They are interpreted,
without exception in our sample, as the only viable way forward for cities, regardless of
other political commitments. However, our most signiﬁcant ﬁnding was that with the
exception of Eurovegas in Madrid, anti-austerity activists did not exercise leverage over
local economic development policy through either participatory governance or resistance
(Blanco, 2015). Such inﬂuence was generally conﬁned to the ‘social policy’ arena. Whether
the anti-austerity Mayoralties can change this pattern remains to be seen.
Third, lacking other powers, all six municipalities engaged in sometimes-conﬂictual
alliances with the third sector and anti-austerity activists, to ameliorate the crises of
reproduction unleashed by austerity. These practices invoke a variety of non-neoliberal
traditions, including social democratic rights, national identities, clientelism and religious
obligation, juxtaposed with neoliberalisation through austerity. With the exception of
Donostia, where social-democratic welfarism remained intact, they were ﬂanking
mechanisms to otherwise relentless retrenchment (Jessop, 2002).
Fourth, and relatedly, there were many examples of whatWalliser (2013) called ‘new urban
activisms’ in Spain. These practices synthesised neoliberal self-help, sometimes facilitated by
municipalities, with recalcitrant and transgressive claims on public space and public goods.
The latter kind was prominent in Barcelona and Madrid, provoking both concessions and
repression after 15-M.Here, we discern neoliberalisation in amutative form. On the one hand,
citizens were given far greater exposure to themarket. On the other hand, where resistance was
well organised some costs were passed back to the state, always in the shadow of repression.
In the UK, contentious politics remain muted for reasons still closely linked to the legacies
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of industrial collapse and union defeats in the 1980s. In Cardiﬀ and Leicester, co-production
veered closer to ‘self-help’ than resistance (Gregory, 2015).
Finally, the dominant tone in the sphere of participatory governance was retrenchment.
Given the distinct traditions in each city, retrenchment played out in diﬀerent ways and in
diﬀerent arenas, diminishing both the political energy invested in participation and its social
eﬃcacy. This trend was reﬂected in the decreased political salience accorded to participatory
institutions by both elites and activists. It was most notable in Barcelona given the long-
established tradition of social partnership in that city. Moreover, the functional utility of
collaboration for austerity management and the role of the third sector as a partner in
delivering austerity have become more apparent in the UK context of ‘austerian realism’.
We found no evidence that participatory governance inﬂuences major political decisions
about austerity, or that policy questions are addressed through sustained and meaningful
public engagement. Trajectories in participatory governance were thus exemplary of broader
patterns of neoliberalisation, and of de-politicisation. The exception, Donostia, brings
retrenchment in the other cities into sharper focus. It suggests that a collaborative culture
is more likely to ﬂourish in conditions of relative abundance and social optimism than in
retrenchment and struggle.
Powers and liabilities: Governing urban political (dis)orders
Patterns and variations in austerity governance capacity are linked most immediately to the
scalar and territorial hierarchies of the Spanish and UK states. Above all, the study lends
weight to the insight that cities and regions are ‘institutional forceﬁelds’ producing
convergence, diﬀerentiation and hybridisation in patterns of austerity urbanism and
mediating top-down neoliberalisation in signiﬁcant ways (Peck et al., 2013: 1093). In
Spain, patterns of neoliberalisation diﬀered in the ﬁrst instance, though not exclusively,
because of regional economic, political and administrative conﬁgurations linked to the
national questions in the Basque Country and Catalonia. The devolved regional structure,
combined with the renaissance in cooperative and insurgent traditions, enabled Spanish
activists to extend movements rooted in the city outwards and upwards, arriving on the
national stage via Podemos and the United Left. Urbanism is at the heart of contentious
politics in Spain. The strength of these traditions is an important explanation for the
diminishing political grip of austerity on Barcelona, Lleida and Madrid. At the same
time, comparing Barcelona and Lleida highlights the importance of urban political
economies within the regional context. With the PSC in precipitous decline in both cities,
Barcelona and Lleida diﬀered along multiple lines of economic structure, political tradition
and civil society culture. Local traditions mediated the politics and temporalities of austerity,
exempliﬁed by the church-inﬂuenced social care tradition in Lleida and the insurgent and
cooperative traditions in Barcelona.
Notwithstanding economic variations and temporal diﬀerences, regional eﬀects were
weaker in Cardiﬀ and Leicester. Diﬀerences in the tonalities of ‘austerian realism’ were
subtler, relating for example to the durability of collaborative institutions established in
the New Labour period and the tempo of cuts. Austerity has been largely interiorised into
the logics, assumptions and everyday practices of state and non-state actors through the
combination of strong central direction, weak regionalism, weak contentious politics and the
dependency culture of municipality on centre. Accordingly, austerity regimes were far more
durable than in Spanish cities. The exception is our counter-factual case of Donostia.
The signiﬁcance of Donostia is that given concentrations of wealth, a strong economy and
propitious regional settlement, a social democratic welfare regime remains viable. Austerity
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and neoliberalisation have been contained, running against the grain of national policy.
Following Le Gales (2016), we see Donostia as a case that tests the conceptual limits of
‘variegated neoliberalism’. The city positions itself as an entrepreneurial actor within a
competitive urban order, one facet of neoliberal urbanism. Yet, the signature of
neoliberalism under austerity is welfare state retrenchment. In the unique conﬁguration of
Basque regional political economy, social-democratic welfarism remained largely intact,
underpinned by new participatory initiatives. For this reason, we suggest that ‘variegated
welfarism’ better captures the distinctiveness of Donostia. This conclusion should not be
interpreted as a celebration of the autonomy of urban politics under austerity. It is possible
only because the Basque Country is wealthy and does not contribute to Spain’s ﬁscal
equalisation scheme. It is rather suggestive of a zero sum game, where what is good for
Donostia is bad for Madrid. Regional eﬀects transfer the costs of austerity from one city to
the other.
The case of Donostia and its dependence on the Basque model reminds us that city
government is but one factor in an urban order consisting in multiple centres of economic
and political power. Embryonic regime change in Barcelona and Madrid does not necessarily
herald a rupture with austerity, or the emergence of a decisively post-neoliberal conjuncture.
Nor have pro-austerity elites exhausted the capacity to pre-empt urban governing agendas,
particularly in relation to governmental functions beyond the control of municipalities.
Regime politics play a vital role in managing and deﬂecting crises through cultivating
austerian realism, mobilising strategic alliances, projecting governing competence (Lleida
and Madrid perhaps the exceptions), deﬂecting blame, enrolling civil society, providing
side-payments and bargaining with insurgents: all in the shadow of ﬁscal centralisation,
retrenchment and repression. Spanish municipalities have been seriously weakened under
austerity, leaving them with little control over vast terrains of public action. How far
activists in Barcelona and Madrid can translate elected oﬃce into broader anti-austerity
politics capable of mobilising further governing resources across multiple policy arenas,
including economic development, remains to be seen.
This ﬁnal point calls for reﬂection on how regime theory could be better adapted for the
study of austerity urbanism. Our perspective on how local conﬁgurations produce diﬀerent
syntheses of submission, adaptation and contestation of neoliberalism points to three
modiﬁcations. First, austerity governance does depend on coalition building through
persuasion, negotiation and bargaining around resource inter-dependency (power to).
However, it also rests on hierarchy, coercion and administrative diktat (power over)
(Davies, 2012, 2014). This is to suggest that studying the capacity to govern requires a
broader perspective on power than is characteristic of regime-theoretical research, but
nevertheless follows Stone’s iron rule.
Second, regime theory has tended to focus on a limited terrain of urban politics around city
government, local business elites and, more recently, civil society (Stone, 2009). Our research
demonstrates that it is impossible to make sense of austerity urbanism without contemplating
how multi-scalar politics – international, national, regional and municipal – converge in the
city and delimit its powers. A broader perspective provides a more sensitive lens for analysing
governing capacity, where ‘local state’ encompasses all governmental and quasi-governmental
agencies situated within the city/metropolis, and having the city/metropolis as their main
concern (Magnusson, 1985).
Third, our study suggests that privileging governing coalitions leads regime theory to
overlook the impact of resistance not just in the form of eruptions, but as a durable facet
of urban political life. Just as neoliberalism shapes the character of urban resistance (Mayer,
2016), so resistance inﬂuences the capacity of austerity regimes to enact their agendas.
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Where this occurs, resistance can usefully be construed as denuding neoliberal regimes of
governing capacity and as co-constitutive of regime outcomes.
Conclusion
We conclude with eight propositions to inform research into the relationship between regime
politics, austerity urbanism and the neoliberalisation of cities.
(1) Variegated multi-scalar austerity regimes are powerful drivers of neoliberalisation. These
are diﬀerentiated in culture, politics, scaling and economic circumstance, but eﬀective in
delivering austerity mandates through the repertoire of neoliberal strategies and tactics.
Austerity regimes weaken welfarism, paternalism and clientelism, though none of these
modalities has disappeared, and extend the market. Thus, neoliberalism does not
disappear when studied close-up (Castree, 2006), but comes clearly into focus.
(2) Variegated ‘neoliberalisms’ therefore tend to strengthen ‘neoliberalism’. Local variegation
strengthens neoliberalism as a dominant hegemonic project, through multiple overlapping
circuits, alliances, scalings and modalities of power: (a) the political circuit concatenating
the strategies and tactics of diﬀerent spheres of the state, mobilising the inter-related
repertoires of power to and power over to roll back the public domain and extend
markets; (b) a largely insulated economic circuit organised around city leaders and
corporate interests to brand and market the city; and (c) a social circuit interiorising
alliances and conﬂicts among local oﬃcials, the community and voluntary sectors and
anti-austerity activists. This circuit is marked by the retrenchment of participatory
governance.
(3) Austerity urbanism erodes participatory cultures and practices. If the rhetoric and
structures of participatory governance remain from the heyday of the 1990s and 2000s,
political energy, investment and commitment have nevertheless dissipated under austerity.
Elites and activists marginalise participatory institutions, as participatory practices tend
to be subsumed by neoliberal logics. Our research suggests that participatory governance
is more likely to ﬂourish in ‘good times’, when investment is high, public services robust
and political commitment strong.
(4) Not all conﬁgurations of urban governance can be subsumed into the category of variegated
neoliberalism. Our outrider case of Donostia demonstrates that in propitious
circumstances, a strong culture of participatory welfarism can survive in juxtaposition
with vigorous entrepreneurialism. Mindful of Le Gales (2016) injunction not to
overstretch neoliberalism, this peculiar ‘ﬁx’ might be called ‘variegated welfarism’. We
contend that welfare state retrenchment is so fundamental to neoliberalism that the term
is misapplied where this element is missing. Delimiting variegated neoliberalisation in this
way arguably lends the concept a sharper analytical edge.
(5) The capacity of austerity regimes diminishes where contentious politics is well organised and
durable. Contentious politics are capable of overlapping or intruding into the three
circuits of power described in point 2, challenging and disrupting neoliberalism on the
ground. Longstanding governance traditions of Barcelona, Lleida and Madrid have
begun to unravel after years of neoliberal austerity and social upheaval. However, even
in cities with anti-austerity Mayors, the scale of transformation should not be
exaggerated, or the tasks of radicalisation under-estimated. Relatedly, the strength of
anti-austerity movements is a determinant of how far mobilisations against rollback
neoliberalism signify the strengthening of self-help or the emergence of authentically
contentious politics.
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(6) The Legacies of scalar and sectoral struggles are crucial determinants of ‘power to’
under austerity. The severity of the Spanish crisis, historic national questions,
spatial compromises and traditions of militant – and military – struggle all inﬂect
the trajectories of austerity urbanism. Contentious politics, particularly in Barcelona
and Madrid, has disrupted conventional inter-scalar relations. In Lleida, with
no emergent alternative, the decline of clientelism potentially undermines the
governability of the city. Donostia shows that the tides of austerity and neoliberalism
can be held back by a felicitous regional conﬁguration of economic circumstances, ﬁscal
and political authority. In the UK, the solidity of municipal austerity regimes makes sense
only in the context of the country’s centralised political tradition, local culture of
dependency and continuing weakness of the trade unions in the long shadow of
Thatcherism.
(7) Stone’s iron rule of regime politics provides a useful framework for comparing diverse case
studies of austerity urbanism. However, a better appreciation of how governance capacity
is mobilized and sustained requires adaptations to the regime approach. First, attention
must be given to all modalities of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ in producing governing
capacity. Second, the constitutive role of resistance in determining governing capacity
must be recognized. Third, regime analysis must be sensitive to the multi-scalar character
of the local state: how every governmental agency operating in the city, and having the
city as its main concern, inﬂuences the capacity to govern it.
(8) Urban politics has a national impact. In the 21st century, political emancipation is highly
unlikely to be accomplished at the scale of the city (Brenner and Schmid, 2015).
Progressive regimes might be viable in felicitous circumstances, but whether they can
mobilise the resources required for a comprehensive break with neoliberalism, at what
scale, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the study shows cities to be critical actors in
setting the tone for national and international politics. For all these reasons, further
studies of austerity urbanism and its antagonists will prove very fruitful as we
approach the 10th anniversary of the crash.
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Notes
1. https://mises.org/journals/fm/February2013.pdf.
2. Austerity here refers to government spending cuts, welfare state retrenchment and measures to
enhance competitiveness/entrepreneurialism.
3. http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2015/07/01/economia/1435747610_668960.html.
4. http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2014/05/23/actualidad/1400866762_388393.html.
5. https://www.leicester.gov.uk/media/180719/general-fund-revenue-budget-2016-17.pdf.
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11. Eric Pickles MP is former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.
12. http://serveispublicslleida.wordpress.com/.
13. http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/local-news/llandaff-fields-campaigners-consider-taking-
4066470.
14. https://twitter.com/BBCLeicester/status/512586314127245312.
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